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Abstract
In this paper we study consumption around the age of retirement. We consider a
model where consumption and leisure are non-separable and retirement is endogenous.
We consider the case where non-separabilities come from the existence of xed costs
to work. We show that the existence of unobserved heterogeneity related to these
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1 Introduction
As documented by Hurd[13], over the past twenty years there has been an increasingly
interest in the economics of ageing people mostly because of the change in the age structure
of developed countries. Since the elderly contribute to a large fraction of the net wealth of
the households the consumption behavior of this type of population may have a large impact
on aggregate wealth. Moreover this group of people may be a useful unit of observation
to validate economic theory. Particularly the standard model of consumption allocation
over the life-cycle predicts that people will dissave their assets when they reach retirement,
a prediction which seems not conrmed by US and UK data since we observe a drop in
consumption around this period (see Banks et al. [1] for the UK and Bernheim [2] for the
US). Although we observe a drop in consumption this does not necessarily mean that these
people experience a welfare loss. For these reasons, the description of the saving behavior of
people around retirement is an important policy issue.
There have been several explanations for this so-called savings-retirement puzzle. Banks
et al. argue that this drop in consumption may be explained by demographic changes, non-
separabilities in consumption and leisure and some work related expenses which are no longer
present once retired. Once they have controlled for these factors they nd that the puzzle
is still unsolved and conclude that agents may face unfavorable information at retirement
which constrain them to revise their savings.
As pointed out by Hurd and Rohwedder[14], consumption smoothing occurs if the change
in the other determinants of the marginal utility of consumption change gradually. If we
introduce non-separabilities between consumption and leisure, people will smooth consump-
tion if they are able to adapt their labour supply continuously over time. But for most
people who retire this change in labour supply is discontinuous, typically from full-time to
non-participation. When we relax the assumption of additive separability between consump-
tion and leisure, then the discontinuity in the change of work hours at retirement will have
a non-marginal impact on consumption. If for instance consumption and leisure are substi-
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tutes then this increase in leisure will cause a discontinuous decrease in consumption in order
to keep marginal utility of consumption constant. Second people at retirement may have
more time for domestic production and could then decrease consumption of market goods
while still maintaining their welfare.
Ideally, if we had panel data we could control for unobserved heterogeneity and past
history of individuals and test these assumptions. Unfortunately panel data on consumption
are very seldom. We could also construct quasi-panel data, but these are also dicult
to construct since we need observe consumption each year. In most of the cases we can
benet from repeated cross-sections not evenly spaced. In this context in order to recover
some of the structural parameters of the model, one natural thing to do is to adopt a
conditional preferences approach and derive a conditional demand system with retirement
as a conditioning variable. This approach is problematic. Actually, standard econometric
techniques will fail to identify the parameters of interest if the existence of unobserved
heterogeneity in the preferences of the individuals impacts the retirement decision. This is
what we show in this paper.
The idea of this paper is to nd economic assumptions which can help to identify the
substitutability between consumption and leisure in the context of the estimation of demand
systems conditioned on the labour participation (working or retired). We model consumption
around the age of retirement, where we assume non-separabilities between consumption and
leisure and treat retirement as an endogenous variable. We discuss the identication of the
structural parameters of the model with cross-section data when some structural parameters
vary among the population. We assume the existence of xed costs of work and discuss their
impact on retirement. People who have a higher xed costs are more likely to retire.
We show that if we estimate the model by conditioning on retirement status, the OLS
estimator will be biased. We show that in the case of xed costs to work, we can derive a lower
bound for the xed costs. We also show that traditional instrumental variables estimators
will not help to obtain consistent estimates of the structural parameters of interest.
We illustrate this discussion with French Data taken from the ve waves of the expen-
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ditures surveys Enque^tes Budgets des Familles between 1978 and 2001. We consider people
who are around the age of retirement. We have found that the xed costs represent at least
3.8% for a single and 5.5% for a couple.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a model of consump-
tion around the age of retirement with non-separable preferences and endogenous retirement.
In section 3, we discuss the identication of the structural parameters of this model. In sec-
tion 4, we describe the data used in this paper. In section 5, we estimate the model by
standard techniques and provide lower bounds for the xed costs to work. Section 6 gives
some concluding comments.
2 A model of retirement with non-separable prefer-
ences
We assume that retirement is freely decided and that there is no uncertainty. People are
assumed to have the following intertemporal utility function
V (c (t) ; cw (t) ; R) =
RZ
0
u (c (t) ; cw (t)  ; ) e tdt (1)
+
TZ
R
u (c (t) ; cw (t)) e tdt;
where T is the terminal age, R is the retirement age, cw (t) is the consumption of commodities
related to work, c (t) is the consumption of other items,  is the xed cost of going to work,
 is the disutility of work and  is the subjective discount rate. The agent maximizes (1)
subject to his intertemporal budget constraint
Z T
0
[c (t) + cw (t)] e rtdt = A (0) +
Z R
0
y (t) e rtdt+
Z T
R
p (R; t) e rtdt; (2)
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where A (0) is the initial value of the assets, y (t) is the labor income at age t, p (R; t)
is the pension at age t with R years of work and r is the real interest rate. We dene
W (R)  A (0)+ R R
0
y (t) e rtdt+
R T
R
p (R; t) e rtdt. We assume the following modied linear
expenditure system, where we introduce xed costs of going to work
u (c (t) ; cw (t) ; h (t) ; ; ) = ln c (t) +  ln (cw (t)  h (t))  h (t) : (3)
The variable h (t) denotes a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual works and
0 if he is retired. Note that due to the presence of xed costs, work-related consumption is
non-separable from labor supply. We have the following rst-order condition
cw (t)  h (t) = c (t) (4)
We dene
x (t)  c (t) + cw (t) (5)
and we get by substitution
cw (t) =

1 + 
x (t) +

1 + 
h (t) (6)
The solution for a given R of c (t) and cw (t) are
c (t) =  (t) [W (R)   (R) ]
cw (t) =  (t) [W (R)   (R) ] + h (t)
where  (R) =
 
1  e rR =r is a positive function increasing in R. Plugging these last two
expressions in the rst order condition with respect to R gives an implicit function in R and
:
e R =
(1 + )
 
1  e T n[y (R)  p (R;R)] e rR + R T
R
@p(R;t)
@R
e rtdt
o
 [W (R)   (R) ] (7)
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Intuitively, an increase in  will lead people to retire earlier, but without further assumptions
we cannot solve this equation. In order to give an example, we assume that yt = y is constant
and that the agent receives a pension p = ay: Then equation (7) becomes
R =
1
r    ln
(
ry (1  a)  1  e T  (1 + )
 [y (1  e rR (1  a)  ae rT )  r (R) ]
)
:
By the implicit function theorem, we get
dR
d
=
 
1  e rR
y fe rR [(r   ) a  (1  a)]  ae rTg    (1  e rR + re rR)
which is negative if  > y

e rR [(r   ) a  (1  a)]  ae rT	 =  1  e rR + re rR : Note
that if people are impatient (r < ), this condition is always satised since  is a positive
number. In the opposite case, if people are patient, this condition may be binding if a >
1  e r(T R) + r    1 and (r   ) > e r(T R). The patience will obviously moderate the
desire to retire earlier compared to impatient individuals.
3 Recovering the xed costs to work with cross-section
data
In this section, we discuss the estimation of equation (6) when we have cross-section data.
The aim of the estimation is to recover the structural parameters of the model, especially
the xed costs of going to work. If only cross-section data are available, we can drop the
time subscript from equation (6). We also add a constant term to this equation. The model
can be written as
cwi = + xi + ihi + i (8)
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with E [ij 1; xi; hi; i] = 0; where xi is total expenditures and  = = (1 + )1. The term i
is interpreted as a measurement error in work-related expenses. If the xed cost is constant
among the population and equal to , we can estimate the following equation by OLS
cwi = + xi + hi + i
If the xed costs vary among the population, we could specify the following2
i =  + vi
with E (i) =  and E (vi) = 0: Intuitively in order to get a consistent estimate of  we would
assume that vi is not correlated with income or preferences for work-related consumption, i.e.
i should not be correlated with income or preferences for work-related expenses. We have
seen in the previous section that vi is correlated with hi and consequently the OLS estimator
of the latter regression will be biased since the error term which contains vihi is correlated
with hi: This problem is easily dealt within the context of random coecient models if vi is
not correlated with the explanatory variables. But in the present context this is not the case
since retirement is endogenous and related to the unobserved heterogeneity. Since agents are
forward-looking, xi reects information about the future and is correlated with the decision
today whether or not to retire. The OLS estimator of the Random coecient model will be
then biased. In this case a natural question arises: what kind of identifying assumptions do
we need in order to deal with this correlation? Are they economically plausible?
The model can be rewritten as
cwi = + xi + hi + vihi + i (9)
We assume that below a certain threshold of xed costs, the individual continues to work.
1Note that this equation is also valid if we introduce uncertainty. If we assume intertemporal separability,
we can use the two-stage budgeting allocation procedure (see f.e. Blundell and Walker).
2This needs some restrictions on the distribution of the v since xed costs cannot be negative.
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This threshold depends on the assets, the earnings, the pension he can get, the disutility to
work and the relative taste for work-related goods. The decision to continue to work can be
expressed by the following reduced form equation
hi = 1

g
 
vi; Ai; Yi; Pi; ; ; 

> 0

(10)
where g () is some non-linear function, Ai are the assets held by the household, Yi the labor
income and Pi the pension. This last equation expresses the fact that at every point in time,
the individual evaluates the gain between continuing to work and retiring and continue to
work if the dierence is positive. According to our discussion of the theoretical model, we
assume that g is monotonically decreasing in vi
@g=@vi < 0 (11)
, i.e. a higher xed costs makes it more likely to retire.
3.1 Identication of the correlated random coecient model
In order to illustrate the point of this section, we consider the following simplied version of
our model
yi = + ihi + ui (12)
where hi is a binary variable which is correlated with i and E [uihi] = 0. This is a random
correlated coecient model with an endogenous binary variable (see Heckman and Vitlacyl
[12], and Wooldridge [19], [20]). We consider here a simplied version of the correlated
random coecient model. We only have one treatment variable and the intercept is constant.
Furthermore we assume
i =  + vi (13)
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with E [vi] = 0. Substituting (13) into (12) ,we get
yi = + hi + vihi + ui
First, the asymptotic bias of the OLS estimator is
plim b    = E [vjh = 1]
= E

vj g  vi; Ai; Yi; Pi; ; ;  > 0
If we assume v has a symmetric distribution, E (v) = 0 with condition (11) imply
E

vj g  vi; Ai; Yi; Pi; ; ;  > 0 < 0:
Therefore the bias is negative and we underestimate the xed costs to work.
If the OLS estimator of  is biased we could use instrumental variables techniques. But
will IV methods solve the problem? The answer will be negative unless we are willing to
make strong assumptions. The IV estimator is
bIV = NPwiyi  PwiP yiNPwihi  PwiPhi ;
where wi is an instrument for hi. If E (wiui) = 0, the asymptotic bias is
plim bIV    = cov (w; !)cov (w; h)
where !i = vihi. A sucient condition for E (w; !) = 0 is cov (w; vjh) = 0: We also need
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E (wivihi) =
ZZZ
viwihifv;w;h (v; w; h) dvdwdh
=
ZZZ
viwihifv;w;h (v; wjh) fh (h) dvdwdh
=
Z ZZ
viwifv;wjh (v; wjh) dvdw

hifh (h) dh
=
Z
E [viwijhi] fh (h) dh
From this last expression we see that we need conditional on hi that wi and vi to be uncor-
related. We also need that E (wihi) 6= 0: Heckman and Vitlacyl [12], and Wooldridge [19],
[20] nd identifying assumptions for models more general than this one which allow to use
instrumental variables techniques. In order to estimate the model with standard instrumen-
tal variables techniques, we have to assume the covariance between the xed costs and the
decision to retire is constant. Rewrite the model as
i = z
0
i + vi
hi = w
0
ih + ei
We need the following assumption to identify 
E [vieij zi;wi] = k
where k is a constant. Heckman and Vytlacil propose GMM estimators. Unfortunately
this assumption will unlikely hold. Since hi is a non-linear function, the model will be
nonseparable. Furthermore we need to nd instruments for retirement and they will be
dicult to nd in this context. We then prefer to consider the OLS estimator of this random
coecient model and compute its bias and try to see whether we can sign it.
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3.2 Bias of the OLS estimator
Intuitively since we are comparing work-related expenses between those who work and those
who are retired, the dierence will reect the vanishing of xed costs of work but also the
fact that people who have not yet retired earlier have a lower xed cost of going to work
than the average. We estimate equation (14) by OLS
cwi = + xi + hi + vihi + i (14)
We assume xi is measured without error and that E [jh] = E [] = 0. According to
Kolodziejczyk [16], the asymptotic bias is equal to
plimbOLS    = E [vjh = 1]
+
cov [v; xjh = 1] [E (xjh = 0)  E (xjh = 1)]P (h = 1)
V (x)  [E (xjh = 0)  E (xjh = 1)]2 P (h = 0)P (h = 1)
and is negative3 if v is distributed symmetrically4,
E (xjh = 1) > E (xjh = 0)
and
cov [vxjh = 1] > 0:
From our theoretical model x is correlated with v: The model predicts a drop in con-
sumption at retirement, i.e. we have E (xjh = 1) > E (xjh = 0) : Again according to the
model, we have cov [vxjh = 1] > 0: Conditional on the fact the agents are not yet retired a
higher xed costs is associated with a higher total expenditures, this is also an implication
of the model.
The OLS estimator will be downward biased and will give a lower bound for the true
3By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we alos have V (x) [E (xjh = 0)  E (xjh = 1)]2 P (h = 0)P (h = 1) >
0:
4if v is distributed symmetrically, we have E [vjh = 1] < 0:
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xed costs to work since we tend to underestimate them. The terms P (h = 1), P (h = 0),
V (x) and E (xjh = 0)   E (xjh = 1) are non-parametrically identied. We maintain the
assumptino that cov [v; xjh = 1] > 0 holds. The main conclusion is then that the OLS
estimate of the average xed costs of working tends to underestimate the true xed costs
and gives an lower bound for the latter.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 The data
We have used cross-sections data from French family expenditure surveys. These surveys
contain data on consumption, labour supply and households characteristics (education, occu-
pation status, number of members, etc.) and is suitable for our analysis. In these surveys we
nd the usual groups of goods such as food, tobacco and alcohol, clothing, housing, furniture,
transports, communication, leisure and education. We also nd data on non-consumption
items like insurance or taxes. The size of the samples should be suciently large to ensure
that we observe enough people retired or close to retirement. This source of data is taken
from the French Family expenditure survey "Enque^tes sur les Budgets des Familles" which
has been conducted by the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) every ve years
since 1978. Up to now there are ve waves available. In the appendix we provide summary
statistics for these data.
Consumption data should be reliable since households have to ll in a diary. In order to
avoid seasonality of expenditures the surveys are conducted over dierent households samples
at dierent periods during the year of interview, usually a month. We observe people from
1978 until 2001. Our measure of consumption is
x
S (p;Z)
where x is total expenses on non-durable goods and S (p;Z) is a Stone price index. Non
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durables expenses are dened as the sum of expenses on food, tobacco & alcohol, clothing,
heating, non durables for housing,health, transportation services, leisure services. We have
designed a variable that account for the professional activity of the head of the household.
This is also available for the retired. We can categorize them as farmers, workers, employees,
white collars, craftsmen and people in intermediate activities.
In the appendix we provide some information about the French pension system.
4.2 Cohort analysis of total expenses on non-durable goods
To be completed
We have chosen in this analysis to construct cohorts with 4 years band. We have both
tried to dene cohorts with or without the distinction whether the head of the household left
compulsory school before he/she was sixteen. For the moment we present the results where
we do not make this distinction.
On gure 1, we plot the logarithm of the expenditures on non-durables goods and age
for the dierent cohorts we chose. We see that consumption starts to decline around the age
of 50.
Insert gure 1 about here
On gure 2, we plot the logarithm of non-durables expenditures divided by the Oxford
equivalence scale5 and age. We can see that the decline on total consumption is not conrmed
once we, although crudely, control for the size of the household. There seems to be a dramatic
decline in per-capita consumption for older cohorts. Older households may not be very
representative.
Insert gure 2 about here
From gure 1 and gure 2, it seems dicult to see strong cohort eects. On gure 3,
we plot the evolution of the Oxford equivalence scale and age. We see that this measure of
5The Oxford equivalence scale is a number of adult equivalents where the weights are 1 for the household
head, 0.7 for a household member older than 14 and 0.5 for the other members.
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the household size decreases form age 40. The household size explains for a large part the
decline in consumption observed on gure 1.
Insert gure 3 about here
On gure 4, we plot the proportion of people retired by cohorts and by age. We see that
most of the people in France retire between the age of 55 and 65.
Insert gure 4 about here
On gure 5, we plot the expenditures on work-related goods and age.
Insert gure 5 about here
On gure 6, we plot the budget share of work-related expenditures and age.
Insert gure 6 about here
4.3 Regression Analysis
Along the lines of Miniaci et al. [17], we look at the consumption behavior of dierent
cohorts of the French households. We estimate the following equation
lnCht =
BX
b=1
cc +
TX
t=1
tdt + f (age) + Xht +   retiredht + ht:
Miniaci et al. propose to include dummy variables for the dierent age bands and to interact
them with a dummy for whether the head of the household is retired or not. We apply
some normalization for cohort, age and time eects (see Deaton and Paxson [10], Deaton
[9], Hanoch and Honig [11], Christensen [7]).
Once we have controlled for cohort, time and age eects, both the levels of consumption
and income are lower for young retired and higher for old retired. There does not seem to be
dierences between people who are retired and those who are not. We may explain this by
the fact that people who retire later may be richer on average. People who are more educated
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tend to arrive later in the labor market and have to contribute longer to the pension system
to get a full pension (pay as you go system) and so retire later.
We have regressed both the level and the logarithm of non-durables consumption on a
set of cohort, age and time dummies, and demographic variables. On table 1 we nd the
results for the level of expenses on non-durables and on table 2 the results for the logarithm
of expenses on non-durables.
Insert Table 1 about here
Insert Table 2 about here
In both cases, we have found that expenses on non-durables are lower for people retired.
We have interacted the dummy for retirement with age dummies. We have controlled for
the profession of the head of the household and for the education (general and professional).
We have reported on table 3, the estimates of the time, cohort and age dummies for
specication (5) and (6) of respectively table 1 and 2. Age eects and time eects are
present, but surprisingly we did not nd strong cohort eects. After correcting for these
eects and for other demographics like the household size and the professional activity of
the head, we found that the households consume on average 6.9% less if the head is retired
and 11% if the spouse is retired compared to a working household according to the gures
of table 2. Note that we cannot interpret this as a non-optimal consumption drop, since we
do not observe the marginal utility of wealth.
Insert Table 3 about here
Even though we cannot say whether the variation in consumption is optimal or not, we
can establish that there is clearly a drop in consumption at retirement. This is important
to establish since we have seen that this drop in consumption will halp us to sign the bias
of the estimator of xed costs to work.
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4.4 Work-related expenses
We have regressed work-related expenses on total expenses on non-durables goods, cohort
eects, age eects and time eects. For the latter we have applied the normalization used
by Deaton and Paxson (see Deaton and Paxson [10], Miniaci et. al. [17] and Christensen
[7]) and the demographic composition of the households. The results are reported on table
Work-related expenses consist in transportation, clothing and meals out of home. We nd
that work-related expenses decrease when people are retired compared to when they are
not. We have instrumented the total expenses on non-durables with the income of the
household and the income squared. We might conclude that there are non-separabilities
between consumption and labor supply among French households. We have found that these
xed costs of going to work represent at least 3.8% of the total expenses on non-durable goods
for singles and 5.5% for couples.
Insert Table 4 about here
We have also regressed the budget share of work-related expenses on the logarithm of
non-durable goods on expenses and the dummies for cohort, age and time eects. The
instruments for the log of non-durables expenses are the log of income and the of income
squared. This corresponds to a Working-Leser specication (see Miniaci et. al. [17] and
Christensen [7]). We found that the budget share decreases signicantly when the head of
the household is retired. A Working-Leser specication seems to t better the data, but
the dummy variable on retirement status is more dicult to interpret. We would need to
introduce xed costs of work in a Working-Leser demand system in a similar and coherent
way as in the LES specication we used in section 2. We have reported on table 6, the
estimates of the time, cohort and age dummies for specication (4) of both table 4 and 5.
Again we did not nd signicant cohort eects.
Insert Table 5 about here
Insert Table 6 about here
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On table 7, we present regressions of consumption where we have interacted the dummy
for retirement of the head of the household with his age. We see that there are variations
with the age of the "drop" in consumption at retirement. We have found that these dummies
are signicant for people aged between According to table 7, this drop seems to increase with
age 43 to 72. This phenomenon might be explained by the fact that the proportion of people
retired increase with age, leading to a lower bias. After this age, there is an increase in
work-related expenses but this one is statistically insignicant. These aged people might not
be representative.
Insert Table 7 about here
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have built a life-cycle model where retirement is endogenous. We have con-
sidered a model with a within-period demand system with three goods which are work-related
consumption, non-related to work consumption and labour supply. We have introduced xed
costs to work and derived an equation for the work-related expenses conditional on labour
supply and total expenses (conditional demand function). We have also shown that the
retirement decision is more likely for people with a high xed costs.
We have shown that when we estimate the conditional demand for work-related con-
sumption and retirement is an endogenous decision, we need to assume that the xed costs
to work are homogenous in the population in order to interpret the parameter on the dummy
for retirement as a consistent estimate of the true xed costs. If there is unobserved het-
erogeneity in the xed costs to work, then we will introduce a correlation between this later
variable and the retirement status. We have shown that instrumental variables methods can-
not help us to get consistent estimates because of the correlation between the heterogenous
xed costs and the decision to retire. As far as we are concerned, we have not found in the
econometric literature a consistent estimator for such a random coecient model.
We have also shown that the bias of the OLS estimator of the conditional demand equa-
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tion when the xed costs to work are heterogenous among the population, is negatively
biased. The intuition behind this result is that people who have a higher xed costs are
more likely to retire. We established that the bias will depend on what happens to total
expenses once people retire. If total expenses is lower for retired people than the bias will
be negative. Since the bias is negative we underestimate the average xed cost among the
population. The OLS estimates give lower-bounds to the mean xed costs.
As an empirical application, we used the data of the French expenditure surveys and found
that there is a decrease in non-durable goods consumption when we condition on retirement
status and that work-related consumption shows a signicant drop in consumption when
people are retired suggesting that consumption and labor supply are non-separable. We
have found that the xed costs represent at least 3.8% for a single and 5.5% for a couple.
We have also found that non-durable consumption is lower for household retired and that it
is lower of 6.9% for a single household and 18% for a couple.
6 Appendix
6.1 Solving the model
The Lagrangian is equal to

 (c (t) ; cw (t) ; R) = V (c (t) ; cw (t) ; R) + 

W (R) 
Z T
0
[c (t) + cw (t)] e rtdt

(A1)
We assume the following modied linear expenditure system, where we introduce xed costs
of going to work
u (c (t) ; cw (t) ; h (t) ; ; ) = ln c (t) +  ln (cw (t)  h (t))  h (t) : (A2)
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The rst-order condition is
@

@R
=
@V
@R
+ 
@W
@R
= 0 (A3)
@

@ct
=
e t
ct
  e rt = 0 (A4)
@

@cwt
=
e t
cwt   ht
  e rt = 0 (A5)
Using (A2), condition (15) becomes
@

@R
= f [ln (cwR   )  ln (cwR)]  g e R (A6)
+

[y (R)  p (R;R)] e rR +
Z T
R
@p (R; t)
@R
e rtdt

We get
cw (t)  h (t) = c (t) (A7)
Using equations (15), (A7) and the budget constraint, we can solve for the marginal utility
of wealth  and nd
1

=

(1 + ) (1  e T )

W (R)  1  e
 rR
r

(A8)
We obtain
c (t) =  (t) [W (R)   (R) ] (A9)
cw (t) =  (t) [W (R)   (R) ] + ht (A10)
where  (t) = e ( r)t= (1 + )
 
1  e T  and  (R) =  1  e rR =r. By substituting (15)
and (15) into (15), we obtain an implicit function in R and ; i.e.
e R =
(1 + )
 
1  e T n[y (R)  p (R;R)] e rR + R T
R
@p(R;t)
@R
e rtdt
o
 [W (R)   (R)] (A11)
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If we assume that yt = y is constant and that the agent receives a pension p = ay, W (R) =
y
 
1  e rR (1  a)  ae rT  : Equation (7) becomes
R =
1
r    ln
(
ry (1  a)  1  e T  (1 + )
 [y (1  e rR (1  a)  ae rT )   (1  e rR)]
)
:
By the implicit function theorem, we get
dR
d
=
 
1  e rR
y fe rR [(r   ) a  (1  a)]  ae rTg    (1  e rR + re rR)
which is negative if  > y

e rR [(r   ) a  (1  a)]  ae rT	 =  1  e rR + re rR :if peo-
ple are impatient (r < ), this condition is always satised since  is a positive num-
ber. In the opposite case, if people are patient, this condition may be binding if a >
1  e r(T R) + r    1 and (r   ) > e r(T R).
6.2 The French retirement system
In this section we give an overview of the French pension system. For a brief description
of the French retirement system one can refer to Blanchet and Pele [3] and Mahieu and
Blanchet [18] and this section is inspired by these two references. The French pensions are
characterized by a pay as you go system. The wage earners of the private sector benet from
a General regime and a Complementary regime. The regime for the civil servants is paid
by the State budget. Self-employed are under a special scheme. The basic general scheme
oers benets corresponding to the share of gross wages below a social security ceiling (2352
euros per month in 2002). Complementary schemes are organized on a occupational basis.
They consist of a large number of specic schemes (about 180) organized by 2 associations.
These are the Association Generale des Institutions de Retraite des Cadres (AGIRC) which
deals with the executive workers and applies to the fraction of their wages over the ceiling
and the Association des Regimes de Retraite Complementaire (ARRCO) for other workers'
and executives wages below the ceiling. These two schemes provide around 40% of pensions
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of wage earners in the private sector. Receiving a complementary pension is conditioned on
receiving benets from the general scheme.
The rules for the general regime of the wage earners in the private sector are as follows.
The pension depends on the number of quarters of contribution and on the average wage of
the D best years of the pensioner career. D has changed over time but seems to be nowadays
10 years. The pension is computed by the following formula
Pension = 

min (Number of quarters of contributions,150)
150

 (average wage of the best D years)
The coecient  is maximal when people attain age 60 with 150 quarters (37.5 years)
of contributions or when people attain age 65 independently of the number of years of
contributions. In all other cases  is decreased by 1.25 percentage point for each year
missing either to reach 150 quarters or age 65. The most favorable outcome to the pensioner
is taken into account.
Under the complementary regime, wage earners have to accumulate points during their
career in proportion of their contributions. Their value is set every year. The pension at
time t for a worker who has begun its career at t0 and stopped at t1 is equal to
Pension = V (t)
t1X
t0=t0
 (t0)w (t0)
RW (t0)
where V (t) is the value of the point at time t,  (t0) is the contribution rate, w (t0) is the
wage and RW (t0) is the reference wage or the price of the point at time t0.
Civil servants have a unique pension scheme nanced by the state budget. People can
claim their pension at age 60 if they have at least 15 years of service. A rather large minority
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can claim at age 55 (primary-school teachers, policemen, prison ocers). The formula is
Pension = 0:75

min (Number of quarters of contributions,150)
150

 (last gross wage, excluding bonuses) :
Each year worked entitles the civil servants a 2% annuity which is truncated to 75%. There
are provisions for women who have bred children. Mandatory retirement for civil servants
occurs at age 65 with exceptions for militaries (below) or academics (age 68).
Two reforms of the retirement system occurred, one in 1983 and the other in 1993. In
1983, the allowance to retire at age 60 in the general regime was generalized. Before that date
the retirement age was 65. In 1993, another reform of the general regime was introduced.
First, pensions will be indexed on prices rather than on wages. Second, retirement at age 60
will still be possible but the number of years of contribution was planned to be increased to
40 years from 2003. Finally, since 2008 the reference wage will take into account the best 25
years instead of 10.
First, we must note that there is some exibility in the retirement decision at least
between 60 and 65. Second, there are clearly dierent incentives to retire for wage earners of
the private sector and civil servants. Transition in retirement seems to be fast. Most of the
transition seem to occur in ve years, since we have quite sharp transitions from employment
to retirement (remind that surveys are performed approximately every ve years). There
might be demand-side eects linked to early retirement and unemployment insurance. A rm
is not allowed to lay o a worker because of his/her age, but it can constrain the worker to
retire if he/she has got a full pension. The duration of the unemployment insurance benets
is limited, but this rule does not apply to people over the age of 55. They can benet from
the unemployment insurance until they retire. As a consequence, some people which are
registered as unemployed may be in fact early retired.
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6.3 Summary statistics
Insert Table A1
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Table 1: Expenses on non-durables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of units of consumption (Oxford scale) 4,514.325 4,470.604 3,542.789 3,889.364 3,891.316
(100.821)** (100.449)** (116.596)** (111.128)** (111.131)**
Head retired -2,456.208 -2,070.644 -1,332.354 -1,352.489
(251.358)** (246.306)** (251.653)** (253.706)**
Spouse retired -1,707.795 -2,035.372 -2,040.652
(193.933)** (182.943)** (183.290)**
couple 4,959.258 4,316.668 4,315.853
(210.326)** (207.502)** (207.736)**
Farmers -1,467.189 -1,480.918
(399.355)** (399.946)**
Craftmen 1,789.580 1,768.076
(394.422)** (397.875)**
White collar 9,014.664 8,982.163
(430.986)** (435.489)**
Intermediate activity 2,829.888 2,803.583
(370.897)** (373.004)**
Employees 1,528.490 1,504.499
(377.921)** (382.847)**
Workers (blue collar) -1,318.904 -1,330.329
(355.379)** (355.484)**
Self-employed 92.313
(205.874)
Worker public sector -37.544
(278.625)
Worker private sector 199.621
(288.812)
Constant 3,038.753 3,071.721 1,928.997 1,245.364 1,244.534
(1,059.899)** (1,056.728)** (1,040.739) (976.672) (976.752)
Observations 17240 17240 17240 17240 17240
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.34
Adjusted R-squarred 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2: log of non-durables expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of number of units of consumption 0.787 0.781 0.584 0.638 0.638 0.639
(0.012)** (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)**
Head retired -0.139 -0.120 -0.063 -0.063 -0.069
(0.014)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)**
Spouse retired -0.088 -0.107 -0.107 -0.109
(0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)**
couple 0.327 0.270 0.270 0.271
(0.014)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)**
Farmers -0.037 -0.037 -0.042
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Craftmen 0.190 0.190 0.180
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)**
White collar 0.573 0.573 0.560
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)**
Intermediate activity 0.313 0.313 0.303
(0.025)** (0.025)** (0.025)**
Employees 0.180 0.180 0.170
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)**
Workers (blue collar) 0.010 0.010 0.007
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Self-employed 0.042
(0.011)**
Worker public sector 0.017
(0.018)
Worker private sector 0.047
(0.016)**
Constant 8.730 8.731 8.669 8.559 8.559 8.560
(0.057)** (0.054)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.056)**
Observations 17240 17240 17240 17240 17240 17240
R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.44
Adjusted R-squarred 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Coefficients for demographics and age, cohort and time effects not shown
Table 3: Cohort, age and time effects non-durable expenses
Expenses on non-durables log of non-durables expenses
date of birth 1926 57.630 0.023
(257.771) (0.018)
date of birth 1929 73.740 0.042
(264.436) (0.018)*
date of birth 1932 160.737 0.046
(307.456) (0.020)*
date of birth 1935 113.151 0.055
(357.904) (0.023)*
date of birth 1938 -38.287 0.059
(395.355) (0.025)*
date of birth 1941 969.099 0.123
(507.827) (0.029)**
age between 37 and 39 1,192.012 0.072
(650.013) (0.036)*
age between 40 and 42 1,765.479 0.090
(494.248)** (0.028)**
age between 43 and 45 2,685.123 0.122
(589.518)** (0.032)**
age between 46 and 48 2,829.162 0.130
(593.826)** (0.033)**
age between 49 and 51 2,301.140 0.107
(622.826)** (0.036)**
age between 52 and 54 2,479.668 0.130
(666.764)** (0.038)**
age between 55 and 57 2,375.265 0.102
(746.637)** (0.042)*
age between 58 and 60 2,575.811 0.102
(791.423)** (0.043)*
age between 61 and 63 2,875.953 0.103
(853.156)** (0.048)*
age between 64 and 66 3,245.635 0.109
(892.648)** (0.050)*
age between 67 and 69 3,493.821 0.129
(928.068)** (0.053)*
age between 70 and 72 2,483.651 0.024
(934.591)** (0.055)
age between 73 and 75 2,095.895 -0.003
(972.759)* (0.059)
age between 76 and 78 1,634.432 -0.069
(1,037.361) (0.067)
Years 1989-1990 -481.463 -0.038
(95.905)** (0.006)**
Years 1994-1995 341.511 0.040
(132.950)* (0.008)**
Years 2000-2001 -15.976 -0.010
(66.865) (0.004)*
Constant 1,240.030 8.730
(977.099) (0.057)**
Observations 17240 17240
R-squared 0.34 0.33
Adjusted R-squarred 0.34 0.33
Hansen J-statistic :
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4: Work related expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expenses on non-durables 0.431 0.438 0.431 0.437 0.437
(0.008)** (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.012)** (0.012)**
Head retired -381.479 -357.567 -359.444 -348.666 -360.242
(79.008)** (78.932)** (78.600)** (85.710)** (86.276)**
Number of units of consumption (Oxford scale) -549.408 -387.747 -794.916 -682.352 -681.840
(46.095)** (46.870)** (78.610)** (94.996)** (94.972)**
Spouse retired -371.466 -426.520 -336.765 -339.637
(66.895)** (58.001)** (68.801)** (69.027)**
couple -475.818 -297.010 -303.579
(79.335)** (96.875)** (97.061)**
Farmers 187.995 184.801
(134.327) (134.375)
Craftmen 43.497 53.088
(136.619) (136.891)
White collar 42.798 39.637
(187.940) (189.075)
Intermediate activity 81.123 78.990
(134.979) (135.703)
Employees 157.499 162.968
(126.258) (127.525)
Workers (blue collar) 108.380 105.023
(112.568) (112.722)
Self-employed 1.314
(73.558)
Worker public sector -202.419
(104.784)
Worker private sector 130.208
(108.218)
Number of children less than 5 years old -106.930 -160.503
(98.725) (101.781)
Number of children between 6 and 10 108.425 50.157
(78.378) (81.964)
Number of children between 11 and 15 45.627 -21.631
(65.452) (71.239)
Number of Children between 16 and 20 429.430 345.520
(65.288)** (72.869)**
Number of children between 21 and 25 645.531 555.590
(86.475)** (95.870)**
Observations 17240 17240 17240 17240 17240
Hansen J-statistic : 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.20
Adjusted R-squarred 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Budget share for work related expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log of non-durables expenses 0.122 0.127 0.130 0.129
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.006)** (0.006)**
Log of number of units of consumption -0.090 -0.066 -0.067 -0.067
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)**
Number of people in the household working 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head retired -0.026 -0.025 -0.019 -0.020
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)**
couple -0.029 -0.033 -0.033
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)**
Spouse retired -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)**
Farmers 0.033 0.033
(0.007)** (0.007)**
Craftmen 0.019 0.019
(0.006)** (0.006)**
White collar 0.020 0.020
(0.007)** (0.007)**
Intermediate activity 0.023 0.023
(0.006)** (0.006)**
Employees 0.021 0.021
(0.006)** (0.006)**
Workers (blue collar) 0.024 0.024
(0.006)** (0.006)**
Self-employed 0.000
(0.003)
Worker public sector -0.012
(0.005)*
Worker private sector 0.008
(0.005)
Observations 16985 16985 16985 16985
Hansen J-statistic : 1.11 2.82 2.36 2.38
Adjusted R-squarred 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 6: Cohort, age and time effects work related expenses
Work related expenses Budget share for work related expenses
date of birth 1926 -31.787 0.002
(87.949) (0.005)
date of birth 1929 -51.342 0.000
(92.944) (0.005)
date of birth 1932 4.092 0.002
(106.429) (0.005)
date of birth 1935 -243.204 -0.001
(124.581) (0.006)
date of birth 1938 -8.983 0.007
(135.492) (0.007)
date of birth 1941 -216.099 0.003
(171.651) (0.007)
age between 37 and 39 -500.372 -0.018
(269.464) (0.010)
age between 40 and 42 -405.450 -0.014
(201.544)* (0.008)
age between 43 and 45 -843.446 -0.026
(233.891)** (0.009)**
age between 46 and 48 -691.319 -0.019
(237.720)** (0.009)*
age between 49 and 51 -1,274.426 -0.036
(246.469)** (0.010)**
age between 52 and 54 -1,314.512 -0.042
(256.798)** (0.010)**
age between 55 and 57 -1,589.105 -0.061
(277.718)** (0.011)**
age between 58 and 60 -1,647.624 -0.069
(291.343)** (0.012)**
age between 61 and 63 -1,722.216 -0.074
(315.040)** (0.013)**
age between 64 and 66 -1,860.570 -0.088
(327.174)** (0.014)**
age between 67 and 69 -2,077.020 -0.100
(337.860)** (0.015)**
age between 70 and 72 -2,090.550 -0.102
(338.536)** (0.015)**
age between 73 and 75 -2,237.932 -0.124
(350.909)** (0.016)**
age between 76 and 78 -2,203.466 -0.119
(373.686)** (0.017)**
Years 1989-1990 100.042 0.006
(34.228)** (0.002)**
Years 1994-1995 -175.554 -0.006
(45.576)** (0.002)**
Years 2000-2001 62.116 0.002
(23.263)** (0.001)
Constant 1,188.735 -0.848
(357.809)** (0.052)**
Observations 17240 16985
R-squared
Adjusted R-squarred 0.68 0.21
Hansen J-statistic : 0.18 2.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 7: interactions retirement and age 
(1) (2)
Work related expenses Budget share for work related expenses
Expenses on non-durables 0.433
(0.005)**
log of non-durables expenses 0.124
(0.004)**
couple -273.040 -0.020
(88.185)** (0.005)**
Spouse retired -341.737 -0.012
(59.734)** (0.003)**
Number of units of consumption (Oxford scale) -664.927
(76.205)**
Log of number of units of consumption -0.079
(0.007)**
retired age between 37 and 39 -123.918 -0.070
(1,574.701) (0.070)
retired age between 40 and 42 -747.586 -0.020
(692.238) (0.031)
retired age between 43 and 45 -547.941 -0.020
(590.661) (0.027)
retired age between 46 and 48 24.201 -0.019
(431.498) (0.019)
retired age between 49 and 51 -353.905 -0.033
(315.115) (0.014)*
retired age between 52 and 54 -40.604 -0.003
(235.605) (0.011)
retired age between 55 and 57 -161.836 -0.021
(171.070) (0.008)**
retired age between 58 and 60 -643.130 -0.037
(146.040)** (0.006)**
retired age between 61 and 63 -310.119 -0.035
(268.988) (0.012)**
retired age between 64 and 66 -719.781 -0.029
(411.285) (0.019)
retired age between 67 and 69 -892.871 -0.006
(952.219) (0.042)
retired age between 70 and 72 -1,018.225 -0.094
(1,000.637) (0.044)*
retired age between 73 and 75 3,341.596 0.127
(1,817.795) (0.080)
retired age between 76 and 78 504.686 0.014
(3,142.778) (0.139)
Observations 17240 16985
Hansen J-statistic : 6.25 3.18
Adjusted R-squarred 0.68 0.22
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table A1: Summary Statistics
variable mean standard-deviation
Head retired 0.41 0.49
Expenses on non-durable goods 15503.29 10635.13
Household Income 26746.97 22814.58
Work-related expenses 4747.07 5333.13
Budget share work-related expenses 0.26 0.16
Farmers 0.07 0.26
Craftmen 0.17 0.38
White collars 0.12 0.33
Intermediate activity 0.15 0.35
Employees 0.11 0.31
Workers 0.32 0.47
Number of Units of Consumption 2.09 0.96
Age of the head of the Household 55.63 9.88
Number of Children less than 5 years old 0.05 0.28
Number of children between 5 and 10 0.12 0.41
Number of children between 10 and 15 0.21 0.54
Number of children between 15 and 20 0.27 0.60
Number of children between 20 and 25 0.14 0.43
Source: Enquêtes Budgets des Familles, INSEE
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Non-durable consumption per capita over the life-cycle
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Demographic composition over the life-cycle
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Work-related consumption over the life-cycle
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Budget share for work-related expenses over the life-cycle
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